

Consciousness and Intentionality

The course will investigate the relationship between conscious and intentional properties of mental states. We will discuss the two main options in philosophy of mind on the debate on this issue: the representationalist approach, according to which the former properties can be reduced to the latter ones, and the phenomenological approach, according to which intentionality is primarily a phenomenal property. Clearly enough, the option one chooses has repercussion on the well-known problem of the mark of the mental that Brentano (1874) revived in modern times: in virtue of which a mental state has to be qualified as such.

Selected bibliography

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- 4) Farkas, K. 2008, "Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise", *The Monist* 91, 273-293.
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- 8) Tye, M. 1995, *Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind*, The MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), chap.5.